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E X A M I N A T I O N
O F A
L E T T E R

Published under the name of

L——t G——l B——gh.

and addressed to the

Hon. W——m P——t, Esq;

Whereas a Pamphlet has appeared, entitled a Letter from the Hon. L——t G——l B——h, to the Right Hon. W——m P——t, Esq; S——y of S——e, &c. I think it necessary to declare that the same is not my Letter, and is published without my Knowledge, or Consent, and contain many things I do not approve of.

Cobham-Hall,
Nov. 7, 1758.

THOMAS BLIGH.
— 1c

L O N D O N :

Printed for S. H O O P E R, at Cesar's Head, the corner of the New-Church, opposite Somerset-Coffee-House, Strand, 1758.

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LETTER

1. Listed under the name of

* date: terrible bar

Hon. Wm. P. F. ...



• L O N D O N •



A N
E X A M I N A T I O N
O F A
L E T T E R, &c.

 **B** E F O R E entering upon the examination either of the singular circumstances for which the pamphlet under consideration, is entitled to any notice, or of the tenor and drift of it, it will not be from the purpose to say something of the pamphlet-form itself, of conveying to the Public all matters necessary to be submitted

mitted to that awfull tribunal, the highest human one, and inferior only to that of the Deity. A tribunal which judges emperors or kings with as little ceremony as the lowest of their subjects.

As if Folly then and Error could not sufficiently multiply their barriers against Truth and Reason, whom they presume their eternal enemies though, in fact, never looked on by them but with an eye of pity, they have of late opposed to them, an attempt to bring this only way of application to the Public under contempt and dis-repute. An attempt so exquisitely absurd and ridiculous that nothing so pretious as time, nor so serious as Reason, can without doing it too much honor, be employed to repell and explode it.

That an Orator indeed, as puffed up as his rhetoric, in a public assembly,
 wrink-

wrinkling his nose, and throwing into every muscle of his face the strongest expression of contempt, should utter a solemn asseveration, that he never wrote or was concerned in writing a pamphlet, no, not he, there is no wonder.

To ring the changes on a small number of trite ideas, in pompous phrases, and sonorous words that filling the ear leave the head empty; to enforce them with a vehemence of action, and a mock-pathos of tone, is certainly much easier than, in a written discourse addressed to the universal community, to pursue a train of facts and arguments purely submitted to the understanding, in a manner that should deserve at least to operate the proposed effect. A discourse, in short, fit to stand the examination of the reader, in the silence of his closet,

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in the cool of his mind ; whilst free from those theatrical illusions of voice and gesture, by which sense and solidity are, as at an Opera, so frequently sacrificed to sound and show.

If Indigence, if Imposture, if Party-spirit, Vanity of Authorship, private pique, mean Envy, or the like, have too often occasioned a resort to this form of publication, what other objection does the form itself give room for, which it has not in common with the most excellent things ; liableness to abuse ? But if that was a valid plea, Authority, the greatest dignities of the state, Government itself would be involved in the disadvantageous conclusions from such mis-reasoning ; since who does not know that they are often abused by being vilely administered, or degraded by falling into worthless hands ?

But

But certainly of all the methods that the natural malignance of dullness could take, to bring the pamphlet-form of publication into decay, the most effectual one must be to make it the channel of such impositions, as that of the recently published pamphlet, which by perplexing the public, how to distinguish genuineness from falsity, might naturally enough incline it to condemn all pamphlets indiscriminately, if its Justice, if its own interest in the real information sometimes conveyed to it by them, did not oppose the passing such a sentence.

Yet with all the irregularity reproachable to that pamphlet in many respects, and especially for so licentious an use being made of a very respectable worthy gentleman's name, to palm upon the public such a production for his, the editor would have even some merit to

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claim,

claim, if it should come out that he was one of the declaimers against pamphlets, since his reason for declaiming against them would appear too manifest not to defeat the purpose of his declamation, by proving that his utter incapacity for writing one, might most probably be at the bottom of his silly objection to them. His stealing himself into a pamphlet in this manner, would, in fact, be one of the pleasantest honorable reparations, that the human wit could imagine.

As it appears however plainly that the letter published as G——l B——gh's is NOT his letter, or is at least so sophisticated with alterations, without his knowledge or consent, that he may with the utmost propriety disown it, the point to which the enquiry is next essentially reduced is, who the editor himself precisely is ; but this may not perhaps be so easy, nor so justifiable in the eyes of
strict

strict candor, to assume so much as determinately to pronounce. Yet may it be safely averred that the range of conjecture need not be a very wide one.

It is not supposable, that, admitting the Royal instructions not to be as spurious as the letter itself, they could be in many hands. If the letter itself was wholly matter of invention, then indeed any one might have produced such an imposition, by making as free with the name of the illustrious personage, to whom it is addressed, as with that of the G——l, by whom it is feigned to be written. But if the letter is really partly his, and partly sophisticated by another, that other must be either the person addressed, or some-one to whom it must have been formally communicated by one of the parties. To ascertain therefore who is the author can-

not be very difficult, on any authoritative enquiry.

That again such an enquiry is not even but of the highest importance, will clearly appear, if the force of the following reasons is duly considered.

Here are *Secret instructions*, an act of State signed by no less than our Sovereign himself, given to the Public, in the most degrading manner that can be imagined. They immediately follow a title-page blurred with private names, gutted of their vowels. They carry with them, in short every character of surreptitiousness, and to heap up the measure of effrontery, are employed to authorise as gross and shameless an imposition as ever was attempted on the Public.

That the G——l however is perfectly innocent, his public disavowal incontestably

ably evinces. Not indeed, independent of the improprieties, and matter of disapprobation contained in the body of the letter itself, had he but great reason to disown a publication, not only without his consent and knowledge, but with respect to the *secret instructions* prefixed to it. These, it may be averred, he durst not, or ought not to have dared on his own judgment to make public, without the express command or consent, of his Majesty himself, of whose immediate act they are made by his royal signature.

But, if the G——l is thus fairly acquitted of being the editor, most certain it is, that the great personage to whom the letter is supposed to be addressed by him, can or ought, yet less, to be suspected. There are indeed many reasons to avert such an imputation.

In

In the first place, the ridicule of what might be justly called writing a letter to himself would be too gross, too rank. It would be worse than *Petulant's*, in the *Way of the World*, leaving a letter for himself. Besides one so thoroughly conversant in business, so knowing in the style of affairs and course of procedure, would have known better than to prostitute the dignity of the throne, so as to place an emanation from it, at the head of such a pamphlet, so marked in the front, and of which the title had even a libellous aspect. Further. It would have been, in fact, himself robbing his own Office, in order to give to the public an instrument that could not but be considered as a sacred deposit in that Office, untill the Royal order, or leave at least, should draw it thence, nothing of which can be so much as presumed from the double indignity of such a method of publication, and of the application of it
to

to give sanction to so manifest and palpable an imposition, not to say downright forgery, as would authorize any one's involving the instructions themselves under the same reprobation, and treating them accordingly.

No! the editor of the pamphlet, nor whoever penned those instructions cannot be the person to whom it appears to be addressed. It is more likely some-one, entitled by his office, or enabled by a friendly communication of these instructions, who has been so penetrated with a just admiration of their style, "*spirit, meaning and intention,*" that thinking it would be defrauding the public of so rich a piece, he did not enough consider all the impropriety of publishing them, in such a manner; for which doubtless he has many pardons to ask of the original enditer of them, whose native modesty must be so much wounded, and
whose

whose duty must be so impeachable for such an use being made of them, unless, as most probably is the case, he is equally with the G—l in pass to disown his knowledge of it.

The public, in the mean time, whilst it reaps the benefit of having so precious a piece communicated to it, cannot but be the more obliged to the editor for all, that rather than not oblige it, it must have cost him in the violation of so many respects. The public too may now be satisfied, if this example should come to have the force of a precedent, that *secret instructions* may be laid before it, without requiring the formality of a Parliamentary motion, or a judicial procedure, in which last occurrence, the publication of them must be indispensably requisite, where an officer is put on his trial of how far or not he may have acted in conformity to them.

As

As to the interpolations, it must be confessed they are very easily distinguishable both by the style and matter, from what of the letter may reasonably be presumed the G——l's own. His narrative of the military operations under his direction is plain and succinct. One may observe in it, what Tacitus so justly praises in a Roman Officer, *militaris viri sensus et validos et incomptos*, the sense strong and unpolished of a military man.

It is only where the editor makes him deviate into the Statesman and Orator, that he appears ridiculous in a garb not his own. It is, strictly speaking, inverting the order of things in the fable, clapping and Asses skin over the Lyon. To examine the letter is to prove this. The incongruities and absurdities are glaring, wherever the editor has lent the supposed writer his intended embellishments.

P. 2. You have the following remarkable interpolation. “ If any person intends to form a *just judgment* of the whole, he must have his *Majesty’s instructions* to me, before his eyes, and with an honest candid heart consider their *spirit, meaning, and intention* without *cavilling* upon them like a *petty-fogging Attorney*.”

Now, were it not for reasons pre-alleged, so highly improbable, that he who dictated the instructions, and the interpolating-editor, should be one and the same person, one might see in the above-quotation, great tenderness and much of an author’s bowels for his own production. As it is, it can only be the language of a deep admirer, interested by that admiration for the treatment of it’s object. And, indeed, nothing can be juster in general, than such a deprecation. It is un-

undoubtedly unfair to judge a man by his words, and not by their *spirit, meaning, and intention*, that is to say, if they have any. The exceptions to the general rule can be but few, as when a man notoriously sets up for a genius, and for uniting in himself the art of expressing himself well to that of thinking well; or where the language is so very bad, or so unnatural to the subject, as to dishonor the station from whence it comes, and to raise a reasonable doubt of the writer's capacity for that station. In either of these cases the charge of injustice for cavilling at words vanishes, and the most rigorous examination is even a duty, especially too with respect to those public instruments on which the fate of a nation may, in some measure, turn, and in which the value and propriety of each word, require the most scrupulous ascertainment, and where not a single

superfluous one should be granted to vanity, or a misplaced desire of shining.

But that the editor had no sort of reason to obviate any cavils, especially so little formidable ones, as might be made in the style of a *petty-fogging attorney*, the following specimen of the instructions themselves may serve to demonstrate.

P. 3. Artic. II. Whereas we have determined with the “ blessing of God, to
 “ prosecute the just war, in which we
 “ are engaged against the *french* King,
 “ with, the utmost vigour ; and it being
 “ *highly expedient*, and of the *greatest*
 “ utility to continue * *some expedition* that

* The Expedition under the D. of Marlborough was over ; as the word SOME implies therefore this could not be a CONTINUATION of that Expedition ; but must refer to another fresh one, upon the same plan of descents, for which SOME EXPEDITION is by a figure of rhetoric beautifully substituted.

may

“ may *cause a diversion*, and engage the
 “ enemy to employ in their own defence
 “ a *Considerable* part of their forces, de-
 “ stined to invade and oppress the *Li-*
 “ *berties of Europe*, and to subvert the
 “ *Independency of Europe*, and, if possi-
 “ ble, to make some effectual impresson
 “ on the enemy, which, by disturbing
 “ and shaking the credit of their public
 “ loans, and at the same time securing
 “ and protecting the commerce of our
 “ own subjects, by striking at the principal
 “ SEATS of their privateers, as well as by
 “ disconcerting and, in part, frustrating
 “ their dangerous and extensive opera-
 “ tions of War, may *reflect lustre on our*
 “ *arms and add life and strength to the*
 “ *common cause*; Our Will and plea-
 sure is, &c.”

In the foregoing single period how
 much depth of Politics! how many
 beauties of style! what a compactness of
 sense!

sense! It must surely please the reader to observe in a piece so oratorially written, so great a refinement likely to take place, as that of transplanting all the flowers of Rhetoric from a college-Hall to the Royal closet; of enlivening, in short, the uniform, plain ground of business, with the imbroidery of figures.

Neither can the reader be but charmed with the condescension of Power to the conveyance, in an instruction for the conduct of an enterprize, of all those motives for that enterprize which was so finely calculated for the attainment of the specified ends. He must be pleased with finding us, at least, *there*, constituted the protectors of the *liberty of Germany*, and of the *Independency of Europe*, so much against all the appearances of things. These indeed must highly provoke the indignation of a Briton, to think how little either Germany
or

or Europe deserve at our hands such a tender concern for them.

In Germany, all the powers of it, except those upon our pay-books, seem resolute not to have what we call her liberty, and what they term her oppression, forced upon them, and have accordingly put to the ban of the Empire all those who are so unfortunately our allies; without considering how much more competent judges we are than themselves of their laws and domestic affairs.

In all Europe we have not a single Ally towards supporting her independence, except the King of Prussia, and his adherents, merely because all Europe is determined not to look on the invasion of Saxony in the light we do, as a very warrantable, harmless and friendly procedure to that protestant Electorate.

What

What a pity it is that some of our great statesmen had not, in time, before such immense sums were squandered away on that rage of ours for interfering with the continent, felt, with more judgment, the distempered pulse of its powers, and on finding it such as they would certainly have found it, left them to their own methods of treatment? instead of which we appear in the strange character of Physicians giving instead of taking fees for our prescriptions and remedies, which are thrown at our heads into the bargain.

In the mean time this is presumably the case. Whenever that single Prince allied with us, together with his party in Germany, shall be compelled by the superior force of so many capital powers leagued against him, to give up the contest, which it is hardly possible for him to maintain much longer; all Europe besides turned hostile towards us, for having

ving supported him in his pretention to maintain that her independency, he is himself accused of having shaken, will be for joining with France to set the dice upon Britain. They will force, or at least endeavour to force her to give up that pretious monument of purely british valor, that conquest made on a clearly British footing, of Cape-Breton. Should that be the hard, the cruel issue of this war, then it will be that those very orators that will by their fatally connecting us with Prussia, and by their bringing on us the odium of abetting the breach of the Hanoverian-convention, have created the necessity of such a cession ; foreseeing the tempest of unpopularity which must so justly attend such a sacrifice, may possibly again quit their places, again renew their appeal to a so often deceived people, again pour out their whole storm of eloquence, and shamelessly join the cry against that very

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mea-

measure, of which their own departure from their professions, will have evidently laid what foundation there can be for it. At least from what has more than once been their game, and from the success they constantly met with in playing it, it is neither unfair nor unreasonable to conclude that they will be once more tempted to pass it upon a community that seems so willing to embrace its deceivers, and to discountenance those whose worst wish to it is, that it may never again be deceived.

So much for the consequences of our having intermeddled on the continent beyond the bounds of discretion and self-preservation.

As to the instructions, whoever will peruse them with that spirit of candid examination, of which the deserved reward is Truth at the end of it, may easily satisfy himself, of the fitness of the plan of descents

scents for answering the ends proposed. He needs but ask himself certain obvious questions, and with a very little knowledge of things, he may resolve them, so as to congratulate himself for the dispensation of the British honor, blood, and treasure, standing committed to such rare ability. Yes! the stocks ought to have risen on the publication of the Secret instructions.

But here leaving them to speak for themselves their own excellence; the parts of the letter which are, or may be presumed, interpolations, claim attention next.

P. 11. “ Delays in an operation of this
 “ kind, upon the coast of France, are
 “ of the utmost consequence, and may
 “ disappoint an enterprize, in which it
 “ might have been otherwise impossible
 “ to fail.”

“ It appeared to me, that if the weather had been favourable, we had the greatest reason, which any military Enterprize can admit off, to expect success.”

Here the danger of delays must be granted in its full force. But the expectation of success may very reasonably be disputed, if, as it seems to insinuate, the reduction of St. Maloes was the object. Every one knows that St. Maloes is by its situation perfectly sheltered from a surprize. The late Duke of Marlborough than whom certainly no one could possibly *mean* better to his country than he did, nor could have more ardor for the service, had, on a view taken on the spot, pronounced it *impregnable*. And the truth is that it was so, to a much greater force than he had with him, and G——l B——gh had, it seems, still a less one. It would

be too trifling then to suppose that no more was intended by the words *expectation of success*, than that of making with impunity two or three parading marches along the french coast, open in above an hundred places, in the extent of it, to the like atchievement, without answering, or the probability of answering a single end, but harassing our troops in a fruitless descent, by the fatigue of embarking and re-embarking, which is alone not a small one.

For where the editor of the letter says a little farther on, (p. 12.)

Where, “ I found it expedient by
 “ remaining some time ashore at *Matig-*
 “ *non* about a league from St. Cas, I
 “ might create a diversion, alarm the
 “ country, and contribute, *perhaps*, by
 “ this means to the recalling of troops
 “ from Germany.

“ It was upon this account, a part of
 “ my instructions that I should continue
 “ with as much vigour, and give as
 “ much duration to the various opera-
 “ tions of the present expedition as shall
 “ be found practicable.”

What is it the editor must not think the public would swallow, when he offers them three such points of view in the foregoing quotation, every one of which is, to that Public's own knowledge, manifestly false ?

First, As to *creating a diversion*. If playing upon words was not justly exploded, in such a sense alone, that end, might be admitted, since to the enemy, at least, the descent produced no other. But as to its breeding a revulsion of their force from any other quarter, the very contrary was most likely. Knowing, as they

they could not but know, pretty exactly the number of our troops, they must be sensible there could be no occasion for drawing away any number of theirs out of any other country or province. They had enough at hand to deal with ours, and the massacre at St. Cas but too plainly proves it.

2dly. As to *alarming the country*: the joke of it is evident to every one who knows any thing of that coast. Who could the descent alarm, but a few peasants, or a few old women, for fear they should not be ravished? There was nothing for the inhabitants to lose worth mentioning. Thanks to the Government of France! a wealthy farmer is a prodigy, and even the thinly scattered houses of their common country - gentlemen are miserably furnished. A long table in the hall, and a few wooden chairs, make

make the chiefs figure in their inventory. A few thousand men unexpectedly landed on one of the many places of the coast exposed to that circumstance, may perhaps take a cool walk unmolested along the shore, and pick up the great material of Caligula's triumph, cockle-shells, or tire themselves with a fruitless stragling a few miles up the country; but what then? after all, re-imbark is the word, and what has been done? comparatively speaking, nothing, next to nothing, or worse than nothing.

3dly. As to contributing to the *recalling* the troops from *Germany*, this is answered in the first comment: to which it needs only be added, that the operation at that instant, could not but be too late to work the proposed effect, even if the absurdity of the expectation was not before so palpable.

But that no sort of imposition on the public might be omitted in this letter;

the taking of Cherburg (p. 2.) is lugged in and magnified out of all measure, which will not appear so strange to those who may remember what a triumphal display was on this occasion made of a few dirty rags of colors, and some brass cannon. The truth is, that the bason, so much boasted, had really cost the French a very considerable sum, but nothing near a million sterling, and that after the expending the same, they discovered the impossibility of ever bringing that work to the degree of utility with which the original projectors had flattered them; and the throwing away more money upon it was discontinued. This however does not in the least detract from the merit of the G——l in the execution of his orders. Had the place been of more value, they would have been equally obeyed. All that can justly be averred then is, that the sum total of the mischief done to

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France,

France, in the whole course of the descents, bears little or no proportion to the expensiveness of the armaments, to the expectations raised by them, and to the good that might have been expected on their having had a different and a more effectual destination.

P. 25. " For my part when I considered the difficulties of acting with
 " vigor upon the coast of France, with
 " the number of troops under my command, greatly *diminished* from what
 " they were upon the *late* expedition ;
 " I was very sorry that his Majesty was
 " *obliged* to have recourse to me, and
 " to *desire* me to accept of a command,
 " which had been *refused* by so many
 " General Officers."

" I was sent for from Ireland, to
 " command the Troops going to GER-
 " MANY, and upon my arrival was
 " *sur-*

“ *surprized* to find the command was
 “ given to *those* who had *declined* going
 “ *any more* upon *such* expeditions *after*
 “ *having made a trial of the Nature of*
 “ *the Service.*”

Here the Public may see confirmed, what was long before pretty well known in it, that the command of the Expedition had gone a begging : that the prejudice against this sort of service was so strong with those who had *tried* the *nature* of it, that blinded by that aversion, they preferred a much worse one, though possibly more promissory of court-favor, the going to GERMANY ! For however many may think slightly of the plan of expeditions, and look upon descents, in General, as, of all the various military operations, the most fruitless and insignificant, yet if candor, if knowledge of things directs their judgment, they must grant that the expedition against the coast of France,

could not possibly be lyable to such unrefutable objections as the transportation of our troops to Germany. Compared to that, the Expeditions, might indeed be pronounced, even a purely patriot measure, if the false light of their having an influence upon the affairs of Germany did not detract from their merit, as if it was fatal to this nation, for the consideration of *Germany* never to mix in our councils without bringing with it the spirit of blunders, and mischief to Britain. In vain, has the exquisite common-sense of the People of England, expressed a just diffidence of that ruinous mixture; the result of the resolutions of power has not the less been constantly and purely German. In this point our greatest enemies and our greatest friends have but one opinion: though their motives for uttering it, may be diametrically opposite.

But

But if the measure of sending our troops to Germany in the manner they are sent, so derogatory to the Majesty of this nation, and so unavailing, the refuse of the French sword, and a prey to the incident distempers of a climate unnatural to them, at least, those men of power can never expect to be heard against it with patience, who have furnished the authors of this measure with the *only*, though the *poor* excuse for it. What have those declaimers against continental measures, to say for themselves, who the instant that they had it in their power to oppose them effectually, and with redoubled reason for opposing them, in the very critical juncture of their success, deserted their own cause, and renounced their own loud-sounded maxims? Will they, for example, when three of our best battalions were draughted off for Germany, from that force destined for the expeditions of their own projection

jection, and which was already so inadequate to the ends they proposed, plead either ignorance of the slight put upon themselves, or, as a motive for their passive acquiescence, the want of power, in themselves (who had evidently taken the lead in it), to oppose effectually the measure they could not help disapproving? Will they, plead as something very valid, that their withholding their negative, was a tacit compromise for their being themselves suffered to proceed with those darling expeditions of theirs? will they, in short, urge that they countenanced by their silence a pernicious measure, for the sake of not being obliged to discontinue their own so wondrous wise one?

But what receivable arguments can they opposed to the following speech in the mouth of a Neutral that should at once

once condemn and the expeditions and the transportation of troops to Germany, addressed to the Chief of those who might seek to renew their stale decoy of the People, (and it is not at all improbable that they should succeed) by declaiming against this last measure, which cannot in fact be too much declaimed against, but of which *they* at least have forfeited the right, who contributed to bring into existence that situation, which is pleaded in excuse for the sending them. Such a speech could not but run to this effect.

“ You cannot, sir, but confess that
 “ in the commencement of our war with
 “ France, a war so just, that considering the
 “ notorious encroachments and aggressions
 “ of that nation in America, it
 “ might very properly be termed a war
 “ of necessity, we stood matched with
 “ France alone. The other powers of
 “ Europe

“ Europe were as yet neutral with re-
 “ spect to us, and the greater number
 “ of them were undoubtedly our well-
 “ wishers. At that time you was your-
 “ self in a considerable place under the
 “ the Government, which you had ob-
 “ tained by renouncing your opposition
 “ to its measures, and kept it for some
 “ years, by running mute with the
 “ m—n—t—r—l pack, in the pursuit
 “ of all its objects. At length, however
 “ you saw your occasion fair for flam-
 “ ing out again. You observed, and just-
 “ ly observed the war feebly administered,
 “ Minorca infamously lost, the nation it-
 “ self dishonored by listening to the pa-
 “ nic alarm of impracticable invasions, as
 “ well as by many other unnational mea-
 “ sures. It was then that this country
 “ had the obligation to you of your ex-
 “ erting your ever - victorious eloquence
 “ against the conduct of the administra-
 “ tion of that time, and especially against
 the

“ the continental connections that had
 “ so long hung a fatal byass on the Bri-
 “ tish councils. The nation in a rapture
 “ to find herself not utterly deserted, and
 “ that there was one man that would at
 “ length embrace her part, and vindicate
 “ her interest, seemed to have forgot,
 “ and certainly forgave your former de-
 “ parture from much the same professi-
 “ ons. Attentive only to the exigencies
 “ of the moment, it imagined power
 “ could be in no hands so bad as those
 “ out of which you was, with such ap-
 “ parent patriotism, employing yourself
 “ to wrest it: no change in short could
 “ well be presumed but what must be
 “ for the better. In that presumption
 “ you had the whole force of the Com-
 “ munity on your side. After various
 “ fluctuations then power seemed to have
 “ settled in yourself; and the people,
 “ whose idol you was, unaccountably e-
 “ nough, become, thought they saw the

“ great man in you, because you had ap-
 “ peared to them the good man, or in
 “ other words, the man of your country,
 “ the greatest of all titles in all coun-
 “ tries, and perhap in this one alone, not
 “ only not dangerous, but pregnant with
 “ the greatest honor and advantages.
 “ What marks too did you not receive of
 “ this honest, generous, though unad-
 “ vised sense of the people ? under what
 “ engagements did they not lay you to
 “ deserve this unparalleled confidence
 “ after such strong reasons as they had
 “ against it ? We shall now see the con-
 “ sequences of this glorious acquisition of
 “ a minister after the nation’s own heart.
 “ The Germanic system, so loudly, so Justly
 “ fulminated against, and almost given up,
 “ began, under your auspices, to be once
 “ more the predominant one. Circum-
 “ stances were said to be changed, and
 “ so indeed they were ; but so as to afford
 “ tenfold reason more than before to keep
 clear

“ clear of it. Instead of employing your
 “ superiority of political knowledge, to re-
 “ press the people’s infatuation with a me-
 “ teor, a people doubly deceived by the grof-
 “ fest mis-information, and by their own
 “ passion the more dangerously, for its
 “ being founded on the most virtu-
 “ ous motives, you made your use of
 “ it to renew, under no better a sanc-
 “ tion than that of this popular error, the
 “ most unpromising and the most ex-
 “ ceptionable of all the connections on
 “ the continent. Austria, with whom it
 “ was so much our interest to keep the
 “ greatest measures, to detach her from
 “ her new perfidious ally, was not it
 “ seems enough exasperated by our first
 “ treaty with Prussia, but in order to
 “ cement an alliance so pernicious to
 “ Europe, as that of France and Austria,
 “ we must by a fresh one draw the ties
 “ closer between us and a Prince, whom
 “ we could neither effectually serve nor
 “ be served by him, a Prince whom

“ Hanover itself had plainly judged in
 “ the career of perdition, and done him
 “ the truly friendly office of dissuading
 “ him from it. By this means, every
 “ Power in enmity with him, naturally
 “ turned hostile to us, who at the bot-
 “ tom had nothing in our own cause that
 “ was common with his: and to whom the
 “ best service we could do, was the *not*
 “ feeding it with supplies, which could
 “ only protract his ruin, to make it ulti-
 “ mately the more certain, the more indis-
 “ pensably necessary to the powers in arms
 “ against him, and the less lamented. But
 “ how far is this from being all of the
 “ bitter fruits Germany has produced
 “ to us, since the inoculating us her
 “ politics? It is not enough that Bri-
 “ tain’s greatest interest must be subordi-
 “ nated to that of some of her provinces,
 “ but what ought to be infinitely dearer
 “ to this nation and certainly withall im-
 “ plies her interest, her honor must be
 “ most

“ most cruelly brought into question,
 “ for the part imputed to her ministers,
 “ in abetting the Hanoverians in the
 “ resumption of their arms, after they
 “ had been lain down in virtue of a
 “ solemn convention authenticated by
 “ the sacred word of her Sovereign’s
 “ own son. Be it granted however a-
 “ gainst the general sense of Europe,
 “ that the perfidy of the french absolved
 “ the Hanoverians. But what good on
 “ earth could result to Britain from insti-
 “ gating or encouraging them to such a
 “ step, for which she was not only to
 “ give them the arrears they had for-
 “ feited, but re-instate them upon her
 “ pay-books, on which it would per-
 “ haps have been better they had never
 “ stood? If it shall be said, that the respect
 “ to the interest of our ally, whom they
 “ were to strengthen against France,
 “ our common enemy, was the motive,
 “ nothing can be plainer, than that for
 “ one power we were so vainly opposing

“ to her, we were giving her a number
 “ for friends, so that it was ultimately
 “ involving ourselves in the certain ruin
 “ that must, sooner or later, await that
 “ single ally of ours, and bidding fair
 “ to frustrate all the advantages which
 “ our own force, exerted on a purely
 “ national footing, might produce to us
 “ in the course of the war. In this so
 “ probably just a view of things, that
 “ great, that valuable acquisition of Lou-
 “ isburg so strongly suggested by the
 “ unanimous voice of a sensible peo-
 “ ple, that it may be called exclu-
 “ sively their own act and deed, is
 “ likely to be an affliction to them, in-
 “ stead of matter of triumph and ad-
 “ vantage. France might indeed, in vain
 “ demand a restitution of it : we might
 “ justly laugh to scorn at her reclainer,
 “ and defy her to retake it. But the
 “ keeping it in the teeth of all those
 “ united powers in Europe, we have in-
 “ disposed toward us by our fatal con-

“ tinent connections, may perhaps be
 “ easier to say than to make good. But
 “ without those connections, where is
 “ that power in Europe that could have
 “ the shadow of a right, or would think
 “ themselves interested to prescribe to us
 “ in this point? May not the restoration
 “ of Louisburg even be made an indis-
 “ pensable condition for the saving the
 “ King of Prussia, if he is to be saved;
 “ and but through the interposition of
 “ France, who has undoubtedly an in-
 “ terest to rescue him, there is no ap-
 “ pearance of his being rescued; and yet
 “ France will probably have effrontery
 “ to insist on herself being paid by Bri-
 “ tain for what she knows to be of so much
 “ importance to her; and who, sir, can op-
 “ pose this? not surely those who have
 “ been instrumental to the linking us
 “ with that ally? Granting them all
 “ imaginable intrepidity, and disembar-
 “ assment of countenance; can *they* with
 “ any

“ any tolerable grace employ all the
 “ fire and smoke of their oratory, in op-
 “ position to a motion, which it is how-
 “ ever to be hoped never will be made,
 “ and for the making of which there
 “ could never have existed so much as a
 “ pretence, but for the consequences of
 “ themselves having, in their procedure,
 “ set their own principles at defiance ?
 “ Can they have so thorough an assurance
 “ of the people’s aptness to receive what
 “ impressions they please, as to attempt
 “ so barefaced an imposition, as exclaim-
 “ ing against their *own* work could be ?
 “ Can they expect that those who are
 “ uninfected with party, those who have
 “ ever seen the Germanic connections in
 “ their true color, who detest the thought
 “ of restoring Louisburg, that they will
 “ not spurn their joining them in the op-
 “ position they may make to it, or will
 “ suffer so good a cause to be discounte-
 “ nanced by the appearance in it of those
 “ to

“ to whom if it should not be success-
 “ full, they and the nation must origi-
 “ nally owe its not being successfull ?
 “ If ever, which God forbid ! Louisburg
 “ should be restored to the French, those
 “ who the last promoted or rather re-
 “ newed our continental connections,
 “ are those who will have, in fact,
 “ give it up. As little will the
 “ clear-spirited opponents to the restitu-
 “ tion of that conquest, be the bubbles
 “ of any endeavours that may be used to
 “ sink its value, and raise that of Mi-
 “ norca, purely by means of such false
 “ weights to make the exchange be ac-
 “ cepted. The people of England know
 “ as well as the French themselves, the
 “ immense difference. In short, the side
 “ of those who declare for the genuine
 “ interest of this country, cannot be
 “ weakened by any thing so much as by
 “ your embracing it. What can you say
 “ for truly British measures, that will not

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“ make

“ make against yourself? — Will you,
 “ fir, especially, declare against the mea-
 “ sure of sending troops to Germany?
 “ You! who know so well who it was
 “ that encouraged, perhaps, solicited the
 “ Hanoverians to take up arms and our
 “ pay again, which affords some color,
 “ at least, for the re-inforcements sent
 “ them from hence, that they might not
 “ complain of being deserted, or unsup-
 “ ported in the step they had taken in
 “ deference to the wise patrons and a-
 “ vowers of it here? Yet, fir, to con-
 “ vince you, that in this address to you,
 “ there is not the least mixture of that
 “ spirit of party, which, those who are
 “ infected with it, see in every thing that
 “ contradicts the sense of their own;
 “ I fairly and solemnly own to you, that
 “ even your holding your power, as dis-
 “ advantageous as it may have been to the
 “ true interests of this Country, is still
 “ preferable to the horror of the nation’s
 “ be-

“ being delivered up again into the
 “ wretched hands of any of the old admi-
 “ nistration, or exploded chiefs of factions.
 “ *You* have, at least, paid to virtue the
 “ homage of appearances, and your own
 “ Interest has lost nothing by those ap-
 “ pearances. *They*, on the contrary, have
 “ to the rest of their imbecillity joined that
 “ of avowing and practising the most de-
 “ terminate corruption. If Britain no
 “ longer produces any truly unexception-
 “ able men of high rank, extensive in-
 “ fluence, and unimpeachable character,
 “ it is over with her ; and in that case, I
 “ do not see why you more than ano-
 “ ther should be envied the task of push-
 “ ing her down that precipice, on the
 “ brink of which she actually stands tot-
 “ tering, and to which she has been e-
 “ qually brought by those whom she
 “ distrusted, and by those in whom she
 “ has confided.”

If the above essay towards an expostulatory address should appear too digressive, those however whom the length of it will not have too much disgusted, will candidly allow for the contagiousness of example in the letter before me, which is made up of scarce any thing but disgressions. To return then to it. To the observation already made of certain Generals having declined the Expeditions service from their not liking the nature of it, another may be added equally true, that those of the most distinguished rank in Britain must, in general, have considered it in the same contemptuous light. Nothing proves this stronger, than that, when the second Hope of Britain, was suffered to honor with his personal presence, this plan of descents, such as it was, and to share the dangers of it, a compliment doubtless paid the high favor, in which the Projector of it stood at that Court, there were so few titled noble-

blemen to grace his attendance. So naked of them was his side that one would have rather taken him for a private friendless youth, sent to sea, than a Prince of the blood, entitled by his birth, to carry with him, the flower of our nobility and gentry. Great as the effeminacy may be of the Age, it can hardly account for so total a destitution. But thus it will always be, in a free nation ; not even the countenance of Princes can procure respect either to men or measures, that have not the stamp of intrinsic merit on them, or at least that of the esteem or approbation of those who lead the opinion of the higher classes of the community, and have influence enough to make their sentiments the fashion. It is rather easier to impose on the Populace, than upon them : of whom the worst is that for particular views they oftener connive at a deception, than they are themselves deceived.

From Page 27 you are presented with the following extract.

“ Even in the most favourable situa-
 “ tion, if one half of the Expeditions
 “ which depend upon so many circum-
 “ stances succeed, it must be owing to
 “ extraordinary good fortune, or extra-
 “ ordinary Courage and Capacity ; and
 “ the Public must be a great Gainer
 “ and have great Reason to be satisfied in
 “ such a case. Expeditions ought to be
 “ considered as *Attempts*, and troops sent
 “ upon such a service, as a *Detachment* ;
 “ the *whole* of which may *perish* at a
 “ particular Time *with propriety* ; and
 “ to the *satisfaction* of every good man ;
 “ because upon one hand a considera-
 “ ble *Advantage* may arise to the State,
 “ and upon the other hand, putting
 “ things at the worst, by their *Death*
 “ the State is put to no danger.”

The first and introductive period of
 the above-quotation, deserves no parti-
 cular

cular notice: it is not possible for any thing to be more true, nor more trivial. But the sequel which appears intended for the corollary or inference from it, is not near so intelligible. To come at what sense there may be in it, there must first be considered what it is that it cannot mean. Thus it cannot be supposed to mean, that when a certain number of troops are sent upon such hostile expeditions, those who go upon them, or those who remain behind can expect that such troops are to encounter no danger, in which some or all of them may not possibly fall, or to use that strange phrase, *perish with propriety*. It may be safely presumed that Britain breeds no such ideots, or at least in no such number as to make it worth while uttering so oracularly such a maxim, for their sakes, who can imagine men may go upon such attempts, with as much personal safety,

as.

as to an opera, a Ball, or a Lord Mayor's feast. To say then, that a number of men may, on such occasions, *perish with propriety*, is to say nothing: for between saying a truth that every body knows, and saying of nothing, surely the difference is not worth mentioning.

If it means any thing at all then, it must mean that a projector of expeditions may calculate such an one, as should be executed by a *detachment*, the *whole* of which may at a particular time be sent to certain death, provided that death of theirs should bring a considerable advantage to the State. But this proposition is not only disputable in point of common humanity but of sound Policy, however it may be feared the practice of it, though never avowed, is but too common. There are indeed occasions in War, when a General, for example, retreating before

a superior enemy, is forced to sacrifice a part of his troops to save the rest; a resolution however never taken but at the last extremity, and then only with the deepest regret. This necessity may meet with the acquiescence but hardly with the *satisfaction* of every good man, even whilst he pronounces the General unculpable. But the case is very different of a minister coolly and premeditatedly in his closet, planning enterprizes, in which a certain select number of state-victims are devoted to destruction. The Romans in the virtuous days of Rome, who probably understood the art of conquest as well as most People since, were remarkably tender of their countrymen's lives, of which the institution of the civic crown is one amongst numerous attestations. Nor was that Roman General esteemed a Jot the worse for that when his Son assured him he could take a town with the certain loss of three hundred men, he rejected the proposal

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posal, and asked him whether he himself would like to be one of the three hundred.

Nothing however would be more impolitic than to let it get air amongst the troops, that such a maxim was in honor with their superiors. Very justly bound by their duty to obey their orders without examination, and indeed for the most part incapable of judging of their tendency, they would, not without reason entertain, a jealousy very unfit to give them spirit and confidence in the execution of commands, that they could not in many cases be sure were not calculated for their *perishing with propriety*.

But the abuse of the administrative Power, would certainly be at its height, when from wantonness, or defect of Judgment, it should send men, on attempts, in which they would be most likely to *perish* without

out any any *propriety* at all. Of this nature are those enterprizes that have either no object, or, if an object, a false, an absurd, or an impracticable one. The Troops indeed cannot nor ought not to be judges of this: implicit obedience is their duty. But when the motives are laid before the public, it has, what it never fails of exerting, an undoubted right to judge of their validity, and pronounce accordingly. If the views on which the lives of any number of subjects were hazarded or lost, were really justifiable ones, if those views of advantage to the state were in any tolerable proportion to the danger or loss, the public is never so unjust as not to acquiesce in such measures. Even those members who should have particularly suffered by the loss of friends and relations, find their consolation in the sentiment of their having ~~fallen~~ with honor in the national cause.

This is so exactly true, that even in this degenerate age, there might be named British ladies, with enough of the Spartan spirit in them, to disown for their sons such as should shrink from the service of their country. But if it was commonly known and allowed that the enterprize on which any number of men was cut off, was, in its nature absurd, fool-hardy, or useless to that end, the feelings of the parties concerned, could not but be greatly heightened by that consideration. One could not, for example, in such case, and such cases have happened, expect from a tender mother, persuaded with the public, that a darling son was sacrificed in vain, a very favorable acceptance of such a compliment as, "Take comfort, Madam: your son *perished with propriety.*"

But

But if in any country there should unfortunately start up a man of power without the requisite abilities, or any title to it, but his own mistake of them, seconded by that of a deceived multitude; and he should, *in virtue* of such power, have the liberty to plan and order enterprizes evidently void of common-sense; it is in the diffidence of such an one's presumption, that the cause should only be sought of the bad effects it must naturally have “ upon young men of “ spirit, abilities, and lovers of military “ glory, who, with a noble Emulation, “ desire to distinguish themselves in the “ service of their country. The number is few: I am afraid the number “ will be less.” (p. 35.)

Page 28. You have the following paragraph.

“ When

“ When Vigour and military Capa-
 “ city are the same in different Enter-
 “ prizes, yet a great deal must depend
 “ on good fortune; for there is no other
 “ way of pleasing the *Mob*, but by suc-
 “ cess; yet *Men of Sense* and *People in*
 “ *Power* ought to judge in a different
 “ manner, if not out of Humanity and
 “ Regard for the General, at least upon
 “ the account of the interest of their
 “ Country. Whenever it is otherwise,
 “ it must arise either from the views of
 “ particular connections, and from little
 “ motives of Envy and Jealousy, or from
 “ a *violent Spirit of Faction*, with a de-
 “ sign to clog the springs of Govern-
 “ ment, and bring *ruin and destruction*
 “ upon the state.”

The first period contains one of those
 trite truths, familiar to every school-boy.
 It is in the nature of

—— careal successibus opto.

Quisquis ab eventu Judicat——

and of fifty common-place quotations, to this purpose, and of equal significance. There is in short, little or nothing worth remark in that first period, unless perhaps the rare and edifying association of “ *Men of Sense,*” with “ *People of Power,*” whilst, in fact, one would imagine, from the government of the world, that they had long renounced one another’s company.

But the sequel of the paragraph and especially the most ministerial conclusions of it, furnish the meaning of that flimzy introduction. For though success is ever the rule of Judgment for those who have none, and consequently carries with it, the most often, more of the fool than of the knave, you are by the climax of ideas led to discover in it a deep scheme for the ruin and destruction

tion of the nation. Condemning the General implies condemning the ministers or pillars of the State. This inference however is no more than that silly vulgarism of little ministers, for ever mistaking their own petty interests for those of the nation. Thence they and their miserable flatterers, treat as enemies to their country such as cannot give a stronger proof of their love for it, than pointing out the errors of their administration. In a free country, can it be expected, can it be wished, that patriotism where real should see them with indifference, or not break a silence that might justly be called a *misprision of Treason*, or at least of follies that to the nation may have the same and perhaps a worse effect than treason? For of treason, an enemy has commonly a better bargain than of sheer incapacity, since he is obliged to pay for the one, whilst the other does his business as effectually, for
no-

nothing. To assign then arbitrarily such motives for the Judgment of a minister's public conduct, as partiality, as Envy or Jealousy, a factious spirit, or bad intentions towards the state, is one of the grossest and the commonest insults of Authority over Reason, Reason that never but serenely laughs at both them and the authors of them. Yet, in fact, those who officiously screen and flatter ministers in their mis-procedure are their greatest enemies : how can they but keep their errors who are never told of them, and whose vanity never suffers themselves to see them, and less yet to acknowledge them ?

But where any British subject abuses his undoubted privilege of giving his opinion of any public transactions by which he may conceive the national welfare is

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affected

affected, of which it is every British subject's right and duty to be a protector; where, in short, his animadversions flow from any of those motives, mentioned in the precedent quotation, the minister may very safely trust his revenge to the public justice: no Judgment can be more penetrating nor more equitable: as favorable as it is to those whose uprightness of intentions cannot, where it really exists, escape its discernment: so sure is its discountenancing of those who would attempt to impose on it their own little passions or interests, under the mask of public-spirit, or exercise an unwarrantable licentiousness. The least that can befall them, is that they and their cavils are treated with the contempt they deserve, or fall down the sink of oblivion.

P. 30. " Though the smallest *loss*, or
 " *even a single man being wounded*, is to
 " be deplored in peaceable times, in
 " the view of humanity ; though inde-
 " pendent of War, *the loss of a single*
 " *man, or even a singleman being wound-*
 " *ed*, must move the human heart ; yet,
 " if *in* the Operations of war, People
 " are capable of shedding tears upon
 " account of the effusion of Blood, and
 " when this proceeds not from a vio-
 " lence of affection, but a *depraved*
 " *feebleness* of soul, to what a *horrible*
 " *state* are we arrived ? The *horror* of
 " the thought makes me silent ! "

Surely the writer of this, must ima-
 gine he was addressing himself to none
 but the compleatest ideots, or to the most
 ignorant of all human beings, or he could
 never have tagged so puerile a figure, such
 a ridiculous mock-pathos, to the tail of
 a paragraph replete with the grossest

falsity and injustice to his Countrymen ! From the tenor of it, nothing better can be collected than that there are of men so womanishly soft as to shed tears *in*, or if you will, *upon* the operations of war, such numbers as to give him occasion to groan over the State, for the influence such wretches might have on it. Not of flattery is it the language but of the severest truth, that even in this present war, our Britons have manfully supported that national character of theirs, established with all nations, of their indifference to the sight of their flowing blood. Massacred at St. Cas, massacred at Ticonderaga, under the General that succeeded the gallant Lord Loudon recalled nobody knows for why, can any one, of their own knowledge or belief, say that the effusion of their blood drew tears from the *depraved feebleness* either of their own comrades, or of any numbers

in this nation, or any tears but from that violence of affection in their friends and relations for which even this writer gratuitously gives them his dispensation. But if tears from any motive but that natural affection were shed, they could not proceed from a depraved feebleness, or in other words dastardly softness : every one knows that cowards are rather cruel or indifferent to the spilling of any blood but their own ; they must then be tears of madness to think to how little purpose, or with what little *propriety*, such numbers of their brave countrymen met an untimely fate. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ !*

P. 31. “ If the success of a Rear-guard
 “ can be called a victory, we are certainly
 “ entitled to one. So when the French
 “ sung *Te Deum* upon account of this
 “ affair ; it was with great propriety,
 “ joined

“ joined along with the *Russian* Victory.
 “ But what has happened upon it in
 “ our own Country, must remain a last-
 “ ing monument, and most admirable
 “ Picture of the times, when almost e-
 “ very *man of consideration* thought it
 “ his own private interest, from various
 “ views and motives, to co-operate more
 “ or less with our enemies, in sinking,
 “ and depressing the spirit of the
 “ State.”

A Judicious retreat has, and very
 justly, often done a General as much
 honor as a victory ; but never before laid
 claim to the name of one. And as to
 any *man of consideration's* co-operating
 with the enemy to sink and distress the
 spirit of the state, which the writer says,
 in the same page, “ would be no dif-
 “ ficult matter to explain in a clear light
 “ and adapt it to the meanest capacity,”
 till

till that is done, there can be no meaning affixed to it, unless the old ministerial one, that pointing out the apprehended wrong of public measures, must strike a damp in the state, from the distrust it might create of the administrative power; a conclusion which would be perfectly right, if the nation could hope no remedy for it, which, thank God, is not the case, whilst there is such a thing as a Parliament sitting. In the mean time it may pass for a maxim in Politics, that a bad administration of things, co-operates with an enemy, a thousand times more than all the cavils in the world at a good one.

P. 31. " But whoever considers MY
 " instructions, without prejudice, my
 " want of information, the state of the
 " weather, and every other other cir-
 " cum-

“ cumſtance; and, at the ſame time, my
 “ zeal to execute every intention of my
 “ ſuperiors, *when, greatly above the ſtyle*
 “ *of the preſent times, I might have re-*
 “ *turned,* after cruizing along the coaſt,
 “ without landing a ſecond time, ha-
 “ ving happily finiſhed the affair of *Cber-*
 “ *bourg* the only particular point pre-
 “ ſcribed, will think, I am apt to be-
 “ lieve, that I have more merit from
 “ the ſecond expedition than from the
 “ firſt.”

The foregoing paragraph may for what
 I know be big with ſenſe, and not the
 leſs ſo for my fair confeſſion that I could
 neither make ſenſe nor engliſh of it. But
 not to have quoted it would have been
 defrauding the reader of an occaſion for
 exerciſing his talent at penetration.

P. 32. " As for many reflections I
 " have heard which proceed from a want
 " of Judgment and experience in War,
 " it would be ridiculous in me to an-
 " swer and refute."

" To clear up difficulties in such a
 " case, one must enter into the whole
 " nature of war; and by this means,
 " in pulling down one difficulty, I must,
 " of course, raise twenty more; so that
 " the struggle would become more *ab-*
 " *surd*, than that of Hercules with the
 " Giant of old; who as often as he was
 " thrown to the ground, rose again with
 " redoubled force. The only method
 " would be to CRUSH *them* (who?) and
 " their difficulties to pieces."

That celebrated dramatic Poem of
Hurlothrumbo might be safely challenged
 to produce, in any part of it, such a

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piece

piece of crazy fustian as the last quoted paragraph. The family of Hercules and the Giant of old, must doubtless be one of those forced flowers of rhetoric stoln from some school-boy's exercise for garnish to the G——l's plain letter: and even the application of the family is palpably murdered by giving the appellation of *absurd* to the combat of Hercules with Anteus, since the issue of it, in favor of Hercules, is purely owing to that very method of vanquishing, which the editor of the letter himself recommends in those emphatic terms of *crushing to pieces*— a rant more than ministerial, more than monarchical, the language in short of the rankest despotism. Slaves, as the French are, they are allowed, for example, under the great tree of Cracovia in the *Palais-Royal* at Paris, every day to start as many such

such difficulties as they please, without fear of *they*, and their difficulties being *crushed to pieces*. They must not indeed touch the ministers, who however are not quite so fore as some of ours, who would have it, that judging the Generals, is judging of them, by implication.

P. 34. " I submit chearfully to the
 " opinion of my superiors ; but since
 " this has been their sentiments, I do
 " not chuse to have power or lucrative
 " employments upon such terms, but
 " leave [them to THOSE who deserve
 " their approbation better than I have
 " done. SOME can possess them upon
 " *any* terms ; I am not of that num-
 " ber."

" I am convinced that this must give
 " great pleasure to many ; for it brings

“ people more to a *level* and *equality*,
 “ which is always the ardent desire of
 “ base, envious, jealous, little minds.

Of the two foregoing paragraphs, the first seems to allude to *some* who did not throw up their commissions, though unfortunate enough to have incurred the dis-approbation of *some* of their *superiors*. But if that paragraph is not one of the botches of the editor, and should even be the G——l's own, it may fairly be presumed, that he himself would, on a just consideration, accept the plea that may be made in their defence. Without the consciousness of the least fault in themselves to their country, and after a fair and honorable acquittal by their proper judges; would not the throwing up their commissions

missions have been rather too great a compliment to those *superiors* for whose opinion they had probably no more regard than it merited, even though the usurped ascendant of such *superiors*, together with the force of conjunctures might, and not without the greatest injustice, extort, from the highest authority, outward marks of disgrace; their only and sufficient comfort for which might reasonably be that they knew they were extorted, and that themselves had not deserved them.

As to the second Paragraph, it has nothing of the spirit of plain military frankness: it has rather the stamp of some little, peevish, fretted dealer in flourish and common place. After all, what
con-

connection is there between the G——l's throwing up his commission, and his being brought to a *level* or *equality* with any of “ base, envious, jealous, little minds ? ” Those minds must only be fought for with respect to the General, amongst the common soldiers, or subalterns, for all other commissioned Officers are, in quality of Gentlemen, perfectly equal, unless upon actual duty, or in the course of military operations. And with the rest of the world, no deference, amongst gentlemen, is paid to a General, that can possibly be matter of Envy. Many a little minister indeed has often imagined, often complained of his being the butt of the jealousy or envy of others, when, the truth is, that he was only the object of their pity, nor would they per-

perhaps have deigned to own the knowledge of his name, had not it unhappily stood connected with the hurt or dishonor to their country from him. The quarry of envy is commonly not an impostor merit, but a genuine one, not a small character, but a great one : and then its procedure is for ever uniform. The wretched sufferers of its torments have all one and the same method of making themselves amends for what they endure from superiority, of which envy is it self an implicit and the strongest confession. All the poor suspense they procure for their misery, is the sweets of their revenge upon the cause of them whom they analyze, or figuratively speaking, tear to pieces. Then if they find on such an operation, what find they always must,

even

even in the fairest of human characters, some spot, some blemish, some personal ridicule, some domestic vice, some scandalous anecdote; with what joy do they hug and propagate the dear discovery that for the moment, not only eases their pain, but gratifies their levelling rage, and in that point of light, gives them even an imaginary superiority! A short-lived triumph, that lasts no longer than till they see the public, more just than they, disdain the detraction, and judge the object of their malignity, not by little trifling imperfections, but by the whole of his merit set in ballance against them. But what is all this to the General in the present case? nothing: no, nor to the little minister at any time, since at any time he

he must, whether in or out of place, be beneath envy.

Before concluding, it remains to be observed, that prefixed to the *instructions* and *letter* there stands an advertisement, mentioning indeed some alterations in the letter itself, to render it less exceptionable. But this is a false sign hung out at the entrance, since the reader, who there sees that the letter was *returned* the same day as *sent*, must naturally conclude that those alterations were either made by the General, or if not by him, at least authenticated by his adoption and consent to the publication ; neither of which appears to be the case. No wonder, however, that the G——l

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disowned

disowned this letter. How could the good old Soldier know himself again in it, on seeing himself so painted, so patched, so much, in short, in the Jezebel-style?

Here ends the discussion of that patch-work-letter, of which many other exceptionable passages might be quoted, if captiousness had had any share in the examination. But an apology is rather due for those mentioned than for those omitted, since, most certainly, had it not been for the air of authority given to that production by prefixing to it the ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS, nothing could less deserve notice nor refutation than those

those parts of that letter which may so reasonably be supposed the editor's own interpolations.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

In the Title-Page, for *Hon.* read Right.
 Hon. f. *contain* r. contains. P. 7 l.
 14, f. *then* r. than. P. 15. l. 8, r.
 No! the editor of the pamphlet cannot
 be the Person who penned the Instructions,
 nor to whom the letter appears addressed.
 P. 17 l. 18, f. *and* r. an. P. 24
 l. 10, for *chraēter* r. character. P. 32
 l. 1. f. *chiefs* r, chief. P. 44 l. 5. f.
enemity r. enmity. P. 49 l. 9. f. *give* r.
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those parts of that paper which may be
reasonably supposed to be the editor's own
interpositions.

F I N I S

ERRATA

In the Title-Page for Hexwood Right.
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